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We present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be
close, and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public
information about the composition of the electorate. These ﬁndings suggest that pro-
viding more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences (e.g.,
through pre-election polls or expert forecasts) may undermine the democratic process.
Our analysis reveals that if the distribution of political preferences is common knowl-
edge, then the unique type-symmetric equilibrium leads to a stark neutrality result in
which each alternative is equally likely to win the election. By contrast, when citi-
zens are ignorant about the preference distribution, the majority is more likely to win
the election and expected voter turnout is lower. Welfare is, therefore, unambiguously
higher when citizens possess less information about the preference distribution.
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1The time has come, I think, to advocate the unspeakable in a forthright and
unapologetic manner, and not in the facetious or peripheral way that tradition
and circumstance have heretofore demanded. By our rules of procedure, and by
any scientiﬁc method of counting or reckoning under these rules, the race for
the presidency has ended in a ﬂat tie and should be decided by the toss of the
coin...
–Stephen Jay Gould, Boston Globe, November 30, 2000.
1 Introduction
The U.S. presidential election of 2000 between George W. Bush and Al Gore resulted in a
virtual tie. Gore won the national popular election by 532,994 votes or just 0.35%. Bush
won the popular election in the decisive state of Florida by 537 votes or just 0.008%. Bush’s
ultimate margin of victory in the Electoral College was a mere 5 of 537 votes, the thinnest
margin since Hayes beat Tilden by a single vote in 1876. While the U.S. presidential
contest of 2000 is one of the most notable elections in recent history to result in a virtual
tie, it is not the only one. The Washington State gubernatorial race of 2004, for example,
was decided by 129 votes in a hand recount of over 2.9 million ballots.1 Similarly, the
1997 race for the U.K. House of Commons seat for Winchester resulted in a deadlock, the
oﬃcial count separating the top two candidates by only 2 votes out of 52,198 cast. The
two vote margin was disputed and the election was ultimately decided by a court-ordered
special runoﬀ.2 Indeed, as Barone (2006) notes, close elections appear to be an increasingly
common part of the political landscape in modern democracies. The very contentious 2006
national elections in Mexico and Italy were each decided by a margin of less than 1%. Also,
Canada and Germany have governments headed by leaders of center-right parties that have
only a plurality of parliamentary seats that came in ahead of their center-left predecessors
by small margins.
In this paper we present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely
to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public
information about the composition of the electorate. These ﬁndings indicate that providing
more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences (e.g., through
polls, political stock markets, or expert forecasts) may actually undermine the democratic
1See http://www.cnn.com/2005/allpolitics/01/12/washington.governor.ap/#contentarea.
2See http://news.bbc.co.uk/vote2001/hi/english/voting system/newsid 1171000/1171887.stm.
2process.3
Our theory is built on a model in which citizens possess private valuations over electoral
outcomes and in which voting is costly.4 Within this framework we explore two informa-
tional regimes, one in which the distribution of political preferences is common knowledge
(the informed-voter setting) and one in which citizens are symmetrically ignorant about
this distribution (the uninformed-voter setting). In each regime we characterize a unique
type-symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in which all citizens randomize between
voting for their preferred alternative and abstaining.5 We further show that this is the
only behavior consistent with a symmetric BNE of the voting game when the population of
citizens is suﬃciently large.
We compare expected equilibrium outcomes across the two informational environments
and ﬁnd stark diﬀerences. First, in the informed-voter setting, the probability that either
alternative wins the election under the mixed-strategy BNE equals 1
2 regardless of the
distribution of political preferences or the cost of voting. This neutrality result stems from
the fact that individuals who expect to be in the minority vote with higher probability
than those who expect to be in the majority in equilibrium. In other words, individuals
who expect to be in the minority suﬀer less from the free-rider problem. Indeed, their
lower expected numbers are oﬀset exactly by their greater expected participation, so that
the expected equilibrium number of votes for each alternative is the same regardless of the
actual distribution of preferences.6
In the uninformed-voter setting, however, citizens are not able to base their voting
decisions on the distribution of political preferences, since they know only their own types.
In fact, given a symmetric common prior over the parameter governing the distribution of
tastes, it follows that all citizens vote with the same probability regardless of type. This
3For statistical evidence that polls inﬂuence voter turnout, see Sudman (1986) and West (1991). Klor
and Winter (2006) present evidence (from experiments and recent U.S. gubernatorial elections) that the
publication of poll results may help the majority win when the population is closely divided. They ﬁnd
that members of the majority are most likely to abstain in lopsided electorates. This appears to be what
happened in the most stunning upset in U.S. presidential election history when Truman defeated Dewey in
1948 despite trailing in the polls by as much as 15%.
4Citizens in our private-values model are diﬀerentiated by their intrinsic preferences over political alter-
natives. Hence, we do not study the information aggregation problem that is the focus of common-value
models such as Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) and Razin (2003).
5Mixing arises from the assumption that all citizens possess the same cost of voting. As we discuss in
the Conclusion, however, our main ﬁndings are robust to a ‘puriﬁed’ version of the model in which voting
costs are independently and privately drawn from a continuous distribution.
6The stark nature of this neutrality result arises from the simplifying assumptions underlying our model.
A qualitatively similar ﬁnding would, however, still obtain in a less stylized but less transparent setting.
3equilibrium probability of voting is strictly positive, and the majority group, therefore, wins
the election with probability strictly greater than 1
2. Importantly, it is also possible to show
that expected equilibrium voter turnout is lower in the uninformed-voter setting. Hence,
the uninformed-voter setting gives rise to elections involving higher expected social beneﬁts
and lower expected social costs. In other words, when citizens possess less information
about the political landscape, elections are both more democratically eﬃcient (the majority
is more likely to win) and more economically eﬃcient (fewer resources are expended in the
election).
We also investigate whether the uninformed-voter setting continues to yield higher wel-
fare as the electorate size grows. In particular, we present a limit analysis as the number of
citizens tends to inﬁnity. In this context, it is possible to show that the equilibrium number
of votes for each alternative correspond to independent random variables following Poisson
distributions with endogenously determined means.7 Armed with this fact, it is straight-
forward to verify the asymptotic superiority of the uninformed voter setting. Indeed, our
strongest result holds in the limit as the number of citizens tends to inﬁnity and the relative
cost of voting approaches zero. In this key situation, the alternative favored by the majority
wins the election with probability arbitrarily close to 1 when citizens are uninformed but
only with probability 1
2 when they are informed.
Our private-values costly-voting model follows in the tradition of the pioneering works
by Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985).8 Ledyard (1984) is primarily
concerned with formalizing political competition in a setting with rational voting and en-
dogenously determined political alternatives,9 whereas Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1984)
focus on the issue of equilibrium voter turnout by ﬁxing policy alternatives.10
More recent papers in the private-values costly-voting paradigm include Campbell (1999)
and Borgers (2004).11 Campbell (1999) studies a model in which members of the minority
7This ﬁnding is reminiscent of Myerson (1998, 2000). There are, however, two important diﬀerences.
First, the means of the Poisson distributions in our model are determined endogenously. Second, they are
ﬁnite when voting costs are positive.
8See, Hansen, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1987) for empirical evidence, and Levine and Palfrey (2007) for
experimental evidence in favor of this model.
9For recent work on strategic candidacy, see Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2001). For an intriguing
comprehensive study of the origins and persistence of democratic institutions, see Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006).
10Aldrich (1993) surveys the three main theories of voter turnout, including strategic models with costly
voting.
11See also Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000) who investigate strategic costly participation in meetings
rather than elections.
4group possess stronger political preferences (higher values or lower costs) than members of
the majority. He presents a limit result that is similar in spirit to our neutrality ﬁnding
in the informed-voter setting. Speciﬁcally, Campbell ﬁnds that the minority group wins
the election with probability no less than 1
2 when the number of citizens tends to inﬁnity.
However, Campbell does not consider the impact of public information on electoral outcomes
or voter turnout.
Borgers (2004) investigates a version of our informed-voter setting in which it is com-
mon knowledge that the distribution of political preferences is symmetric (i.e., each citizen
is equally likely to prefer either alternative). In this context, Borgers shows that equilibrium
voter turnout may be excessive, and he argues cogently that compulsory-voting laws, there-
fore, may make little sense. Because it focuses on symmetrically distributed types, Borgers’
model cannot address the electoral bias at the heart of our analysis. Moreover, Borgers
does not consider the uninformed-voter setting and thus the impact of public information
on expected turnout or electoral outcomes.
Two recent papers that are perhaps the closest to our investigation are Krasa and
Polborn (2009) and Goeree and Grosser (2007). Krasa and Polborn generalize the Borg-
ers (2004) model to incorporate a general distribution of political preferences and a large
electorate. They independently derive an asymptotic neutrality result akin to the one we
present below in the informed-voter setting, which leads them to recommend subsidizing
voter participation. Our ﬁndings in the uninformed-voter setting, by contrast, illustrate that
political neutrality can be broken with even lower turnout than in the Krasa and Polborn
model if voters are uncertain about the distribution of political preferences. Goeree and
Groser (2007) also study the impact of information on electoral outcomes in small elections.
Several of their ﬁndings regarding the eﬀect of information have analogues in our analysis of
small elections, though they were independently discovered in a somewhat diﬀerent setup.
Goeree and Groser do not, however, investigate large elections — the setting in which our
most important ﬁndings are demonstrated12 — or comparative static and welfare properties
of information uncertainty.
In a common-values setting, Martinelli (2006) examines the performance of elections in
aggregating information when information, rather than participation, is costly. Martinelli
shows that while the information acquired by each voter approaches to zero as the electorate
12In particular, there always exists an equilibrium in totally mixed strategies if electorate size is suﬃciently
large.
5becomes large, it does so slowly enough for the electorate as a whole to (approximately) make
the “right” decision. Martinelli’s ﬁnding paralels our limit result under the uninformed-
setting: as the electorate grows, each individual votes with a vanishingly small probability,
but the alternative favored by the majority prevails (almost) surely. Finally, Bernhardt,
Duggan, and Squintani (forthcoming) investigate a setting complementary to ours in which
candidates learn about voter preferences through polls. They ﬁnd that citizens prefer private
polls to public ones because public polls induce the candidates to cluster their platforms
around the preferences of the median voter. Hence, the electorate may be better represented
when candidates possess less information about voter preferences.
In the next section we set out the model. Sections 3 and 4 contain the analysis of
the informed-voter setting and the uninformed-voter setting respectively. In Section 5 we
perform welfare comparisons across the two regimes. Section 6 contains an extension in-
vestigating the impact of increased uncertainty on the equilibrium in the uninformed-voter
setting. We conclude in Section 7 with a brief discussion of three avenues for possible future
research. Several technical lemmas and the proofs of all results appear in the Appendix.
2 The Model
There are n ≥ 2 agents who may cast a vote in an election between two alternatives, A and
B. Each agent is one of two types, one who prefers A or one who prefers B. A type t agent
receives a gross payoﬀ normalized to 1, if alternative t is implemented and 0 otherwise for
t = A,B.13 The cost of voting is c ∈ (0,1] for all agents.14 Hence, each agent possesses
two (relevant) actions, to abstain or to vote for his preferred alternative because abstaining
strictly dominates voting for one’s less preferred alternative in this context. The ex post
payoﬀ of a type t agent is given in Table 1.
Action/Outcome t wins t loses
Abstain 1 0
Vote 1 − c 0 − c
Table 1: Ex post Payoﬀs
Agents simultaneously choose whether to vote. The election is decided by majority rule
and ties are broken by a fair coin toss. Each agent privately knows his type but believes
13To avoid repetition, whenever we use t and t
￿, we mean t,t
￿ = A,B and t ￿= t
￿ throughout.
14Given that the beneﬁt of winning is normalized to 1, c represents the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio. In the
Conclusion, we brieﬂy discuss the robustness of our results with respect to heterogenous costs of voting.
6that the preferences of the other agents are determined by realizations of i.i.d. random
variables where the probability that an agent is type t is λt ∈ (0,1) and λA + λB = 1.
We compare type-symmetric Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) outcomes of the class
of voting games just described across two informational settings. In the informed-voter
setting, the value of λt is common knowledge among all agents. In the uninformed-voter
setting, all agents possess a non-degenerate common prior over possible values of λt.
3 Informed Voters
Let φt ∈ [0,1] be the probability that a type-t agent votes (i.e., he abstains with probability
1 − φt). A symmetric BNE in this setting is a pair of probabilities (φA,φB) such that it
is optimal for a type t agent to vote with probability φt when all other agents adhere to
this strategy. To ﬁnd such an equilibrium, note that a type t agent compares the expected
payoﬀ from voting, U1
t , to the expected payoﬀ from abstaining, U0
t , whose expressions are
provided in the Appendix. Let ∆t = U1
t − U0
t denote the net expected utility for a type t
agent from voting.
In order to write ∆t in a more useful form, let the ex ante probability that a type
t agent votes be denoted by αt = λtφt. Hence, the ex ante probability of abstaining is
1−αA−αB. Also, recall that the number of ways kA agents can vote for A, kB can vote for







L￿￿￿￿ 1. Suppose 0 < φt < 1 for t = A,B. Then, the net expected utility to a type t





























t￿ (1 − αt − αt￿)n−2−2k,
for t = A,B, t ￿= t￿, and ￿·￿ is the usual operator that rounds a number to the lower
integer when necessary.
7This lemma has a very intuitive interpretation. It says that the net expected utility
to a type t agent from voting is composed of three parts. Speciﬁcally, Pt(αt,αt￿,n) is the
ex ante probability that his vote is pivotal. The ﬁrst summation in (2) is the probability
that his vote breaks a tie (i.e., the event that k of the other agents vote for each alternative
and n − 1 − 2k of them abstain). The second summation is the probability that his vote
creates a tie (i.e., the event that k of the other agents vote for alternative t, k + 1 vote for
t￿, and n − 2 − 2k abstain). In each case, the agent’s vote raises the probability of winning
by 1
2. The third term in eq. (1) is simply the agent’s cost of voting. Note that we restrict
attention to totally mixed strategies, but we will show that this is the case for suﬃciently
large electorates and/or a suﬃciently large cost of voting.
A convenient feature of Lemma 1 is that the net expected utility from voting can be
expressed entirely in terms of the ex ante probabilities, αA and αB. This derives from the
fact that λA and λB are common knowledge so that each agent perfectly customizes his
voting strategy to the distribution of political preferences. This along with the symmetry
of the net-expected payoﬀ functions given in eq. (1) yield
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1. (Weak Neutrality in Small Elections) Suppose (φA,φB) is a symmetric
BNE in totally mixed strategies; i.e., 0 < φt < 1 for t = A,B.
(a) The ex ante probability that an agent votes for alternative A equals the ex ante proba-
bility that he votes for B,
λAφA = λBφB.





This result says that in a type-symmetric mixed-strategy BNE, the probability that
either alternative is implemented does not depend on λt. Hence, the alternative that is
preferred by the expected majority wins the election with the same probability as the one
that is preferred by the expected minority. The intuition underlying this result rests on
a delicate trade-oﬀ between an agent’s incentive to win the election and his incentive to
free ride on other voters who likely share his preferences. For instance, if λA > 1
2, then
a type A agent knows that he is most likely a member of the majority and he has a
relatively high incentive to free ride (i.e., he votes with lower probability). On the other
8hand, a type B agent knows that he is most likely a member of the minority and he has
a relatively low incentive to free ride (i.e., he votes with higher probability). Remarkably,
these eﬀects exactly balance in equilibrium leading to a situation in which the inherently
stronger position of a type A agent is completely neutralized.15
In light of Proposition 1, let α denote the ex ante probability that an agent votes for
one of the two alternatives in a symmetric totally mixed-strategy BNE (when one exists).
Since the ex ante probability that he votes at all is 2α, it must be that 0 < α ≤ 1
2. In
order to ﬁnd a mixed-strategy equilibrium, it is, therefore, necessary to ﬁnd a solution in
this range to the polynomial indiﬀerence equation
1
2
P(α,n) − c = 0, (3)
where P(α,n) = Pt(α,α,n).
The function P(α,n) gives the probability that a given agent’s vote is pivotal when the
other n − 1 agents vote for each alternative with ex ante probability α and abstain with
probability 1 − 2α.
L￿￿￿￿ 2. P(α,n) is strictly decreasing in α ∈ [0, 1
2].
Intuitively, a given agent’s vote is less likely to be pivotal when others vote with a higher
ex ante probability leading to a greater expected voter turnout. An important implication
of Lemma 2 is that there is at most one solution to eq.(3). Furthermore, there exists a
solution if and only if 1
2P(0,n) > c and 1
2P(1
2,n) ≤ c. Let α∗(c,n) denote the solution when
it exists. Note that existence of α∗(c,n) is necessary but not suﬃcient for existence of a
totally mixed-strategy BNE. In particular, existence of a totally mixed-strategy BNE also
requires 0 < φt = α∗(c,n)/λt < 1.
15Anecdotal evidence supporting Proposition 1 comes from the frequent failure of pre-election polls in
predicting outcomes. For instance, Jowell, Hedges, Lynn, Farrant and Heath (1993) report that in the 1992
British election, while all polls predicted a very close ﬁnish, with the Labor Party victory, the Conservatives
in fact won with a signiﬁcant lead of 7.6 percent. Similarly, Durand, Blais and Vachon (2001) record that in
the 1998 general elections in Quebec, public polls overwhelmingly predicted an easy victory for the ruling
Parti Quebecois, a party dedicated to Quebec sovereignty. Yet, the Quebec Liberal Party ended up winning.
Finally, Durand, Blais and Larochelle (2004) note that in the 2002 French presidential elections, although
polls consistently predicted a matchup between the incumbent president, Jacques Chirac, and the incumbent
prime minister, Lionel Jospin, in the second round, Jean-Marie Le Pen from an extremist right-wing party
instead ﬁnished second. Interestingly, a common defense by the pollsters has been the weak turnout by the
expected majority on the election day.
9P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2. (Characterization)There exists a unique type-symmetric BNE in totally
mixed strategies if and only if




























, if n is even.
(6)
Condition (4) speciﬁes the range of voting costs for which a solution α∗(c,n) ∈ (0, 1
2]
to (3) exists. Speciﬁcally, if c ≥ 1
2, then the unique BNE is for all agents to abstain. A
deviating agent would surely be pivotal (P(0,n) = 1), but deviating is still not proﬁtable
(1
2P(0,n) ≤ c). On the other hand, if c ≤ c(n), then at least one type of agent must
vote with probability 1 in equilibrium since α∗(c,n) ≥ 1
2. When (4) is satisﬁed, existence
of a symmetric totally mixed-strategy BNE also requires that λt not be too extreme. In
particular, if (5) fails, then the agents in the expected minority will be unable to “neutralize”
the expected majority even if they vote with certainty.
As an illustration of Proposition 2, suppose n = 2. In this case α∗ = 1 − 2c. Hence,
a type-symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium exists if and only if c ∈ (1
4, 1
2) and λt ∈
(1−2c,2c). Next, we show that such an equilibrium exists for a wider range of parameters
as the electorate size increases.
Electorate Size and the Prevalence of the Neutrality
Our objective here is to perform a comparative static with respect to the electorate size,
n, and do a limit analysis for n → ∞. Since we are ultimately interested in social welfare, we
characterize not only the election outcome but also the expected turnout in the limit. We
emphasize, however, that our limit analysis is meant to present a theoretical benchmark
rather than to resolve the celebrated “paradox of not voting” formalized by Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1985).
L￿￿￿￿ 3.
(i) α∗(c,n) is decreasing in n, and converges to 0 as n → ∞.
10(ii) c(n) is decreasing, and converges to 0 as n → ∞.
(iii) P(α∗
t(c,n),α∗
t￿(c,n),n) = 2c as n → ∞.
Part (i) of Lemma 3 reveals that as the electorate size increases, each agent is less likely
to vote. This is because a larger electorate means a proportionally larger minority group
and a proportionally larger majority group, which, in turn, means a more severe free rider
problem within each group. Thus, it must take an even smaller cost for an agent to vote with
certainty, as recorded in part (ii). Together with Proposition 2, parts (i) and (ii) imply that
a type-symmetric equilibrium in totally mixed strategies, and therefore the weak neutrality
identiﬁed in Proposition 1, is more likely to obtain, as the number of citizens grows. Finally,
since each agent plays a mixed strategy in equilibrium in a suﬃciently large election, part
(iii) states that the equilibrium indiﬀerence condition in (3) must hold.16
Next, we determine the expected turnout in the limit. To do so, let Xt be the number
of votes for alternative t, and X0 = n−XA −XB be the number of abstentions. Using this
notation, a type t agent’s vote is pivotal if and only if Xt = Xt￿ (his vote creates a tie), or




t￿(c,n),n) = Pr{Xt = Xt￿} + Pr{Xt = Xt￿ + 1}. (7)





Although, for a ﬁxed n, the random variables, XA and XB, are clearly correlated,17 the
following lemma shows they are independent as n → ∞. Let mt = limn→∞[nα∗
t(c,n)] be
the expected equilibrium turnout for type t citizens in the limit.18
L￿￿￿￿ 4. The limiting marginal distributions of XA and XB are independent Poisson
distributions with means mA and mB, respectively. Hence, the limiting distribution
of XA + XB is also Poisson with mean mA + mB.
In light of Lemma 4, let f(k|µ) be the p.d.f. for a Poisson distribution with mean µ.




t￿(c,n),n) = 2c for all n at a totally mixed-strategy equilibrium, and by
Lemma 3, such an equilibrium is the only one as n → ∞.
17The correlation coeﬃcient is −nα
∗2(c,n).
18It can be easily veriﬁed that these limits exist and they are ﬁnite.
11Recall that f(k|µ) =
µke−µ












f(k|mt)f(k + 1|mt￿) (8)
≡ ΦI(mt,mt￿).
Moreover, using part (iii) of Lemma 3, eq.(8) implies that the equilibrium limiting
turnouts (in the Informed regime), mI
A and mI
B, must solve
ΦI(mA,mB) = 2c and ΦI(mB,mA) = 2c. (9)
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3. (Strong Neutrality in Large Elections) In the informed regime, for any
voting cost c ∈ (0, 1
2) and any distribution of preferences λt ∈ (0,1), there exists a
critical population size n such that n ≥ n implies the existence of a unique type-
symmetric BNE. Moreover,





2 , where the expected aggregate turnout, MI ∈ (0,∞), uniquely solves
ΦI(M
2 , M
2 ) = 2c.
Part (a) of Proposition 3 is a direct implication of Lemma 3. It indicates that the
neutrality result identiﬁed in Proposition 1 is endemic to elections with large populations.
In other words, when the distribution of voter preferences is common knowledge, large
elections are likely to be close for (approximately) the whole parameter space. As explained
in Proposition 1, this neutrality result is a consequence of the strategic voting behavior:
when agents have “good” information about voter preferences, they are able to customize
their voting decisions to the relative size of the groups.
Part (b) of Proposition 3 points to an additional kind of neutrality, which is absent
in small elections. It says that in large elections, the expected turnout for each group is
independent of the distribution of voter preferences.19 That is, two large elections with
19Of course, the equality of turnouts is an artifact of the assumption that the cost of voting is the same
for both types of agents. However, it should be clear from (9) that even if costs were diﬀerent, the limit
turnouts would still be independent of the distribution of political preferences, i.e., λt. Moreover, this result
is robust to an extension with private cost of voting, where each agent draws his cost from a distribution.
For more on this point, see the discussion in the Conclusion and in Taylor and Yildirim (2008) for a formal
derivation.
12λt = 1
2 and λt = 99
100 result in the same expected turnout for each alternative, contrary to
what intuition suggests.
R￿￿￿￿￿ 1. While theoretically intriguing, by the weak and strong neutrality results, we
do not suggest that elections, especially those with large electorates, will tend to be
close regardless of the actual polling results; because in reality, polls provide only
a noisy estimate of the preference distribution, λt. Such noise is likely to prevent
citizens from perfectly customizing their voting decisions to the relative size of the
political groups. In fact, we show in the next section that when citizens are uncertain
about the preference distribution, the neutrality result breaks and it does so in favor
of the majority.
R￿￿￿￿￿ 2. One may wonder whether our restriction to type-symmetric strategies may
be unduly intensifying the free-rider problem and preventing the majority from win-
ning. Note, however, that in the presence of the incomplete information about others’
preferences, and the resulting uncertainty about the group sizes, perfectly coordinated
voting strategies for the majority to guarantee a win would not be sustained in any
equilibrium.
4 Uninformed Voters
Consider a setting in which λt is not common knowledge. Speciﬁcally, suppose that before
learning their types, the agents’ beliefs about λt correspond to a non-degenerate common
prior distribution. For ease of exposition, assume that the prior is symmetric and deﬁned
over a ﬁnite set of values, λ1 > λ2 > ··· > λr, where r ≥ 2.20 Symmetry of the prior
requires Pr{λt = λi} = Pr{λt￿ = λi} = θi ∈ (0,1), for i = 1,...,r. This implies that
E[λt] = 1
2. Also, after learning their types, agents’ updated beliefs are
Pr{λt = λi|t} = 2θiλi.
Notice Pr{λt = λi|t} ≥ Pr{λt = λi} if and only if λi ≥ 1
2. That is, upon observing their
own types, agents put more weight on being in the majority—a fact that will be useful in
developing the intuition below.
20Symmetry of the prior is assumed both for tractability and in order to isolate the role of information
from any ex ante advantage. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the welfare results presented below are
conditioned on the realization of λ
i; i.e., we do not assume that actual political preferences are symmetrically
distributed.
13As in the informed-voter setting, a symmetric BNE in this context corresponds to a pair
of voting probabilities (φA,φB). Moreover, (φA,φB) is a symmetric BNE in totally mixed
strategies if and only if it satisﬁes the indiﬀerence conditions
1
2
E[Pt(λtφt,λt￿φt￿)|t] − c = 0, (10)
where Pt(·,·) is deﬁned in (2).
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4. (Non-neutrality) Suppose (φA,φB) is a type-symmetric BNE in totally
mixed strategies. Then,
(a) φA = φB = φ.
(b) For n < ∞, Pr{t wins|λt = λi} > 1
2 if and only if λi > 1
2.
Part (a) of this result indicates that any type-symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies
must be strongly symmetric in the sense that all agents vote with the same probability
regardless of type.21 The intuition is straightforward. When the prior is symmetric, an
agent who discovers that he is type A learns as much about the environment as an agent who
discovers that he is type B. Hence, both types vote with the same probability in equilibrium.
This contrasts sharply with part (a) of Proposition 1 where it is shown that agents in the
expected minority vote with higher probability than those in the expected majority. This
eﬀect is absent in the uninformed-voter setting because no agent expects to be in the
minority conditional on learning only his own type. In particular, E[λt|t] = 2E[λ2
t] > 1
2.
Next, consider part (b). Because both types of agents vote with the same probability,
it follows that the alternative with the expected majority is strictly more likely to win the
election. Again, this contrasts with Proposition 1 where it was shown that each alternative
was equally likely to win when λt was common knowledge.
In order to characterize a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies in the uninformed-
voter setting, we use φA = φB = φ and note that the expected probability of being pivotal
in equilibrium is





2θiT(φ,n|λA = λi) (11)
21This strong symmetry result, which Goeree and Groser (2007) simply assume, will play a key role in the
main ﬁnding about welfare.
14where we deﬁne








k,k,n − 1 − 2k
￿








k,k + 1,n − 2 − 2k
￿
(λi(1 − λi))k+1φ2k+1(1 − φ)n−2−2k.
Hence, the equilibrium φ∗ must solve
1
2
Q(φ,n) − c = 0. (13)
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5. In the uninformed setting, there exists a unique type-symmetric BNE in






















, if n is even.
Similar to Proposition 2 of the preceding section, this result characterizes the region
of the parameter space where the unique type-symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies
obtains. Speciﬁcally, if c ≥ 1
2, then no agents vote in equilibrium, and if c ≤ c(n), then they
all vote with certainty. In order to facilitate comparison with the informed-voter setting, it
is necessary to know how c(n) compares with c(n).
L￿￿￿￿ 5. For any n, c(n) < c(n).
Lemma 5 indicates that if a type-symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies obtains in
the informed-voter setting, then an analogous BNE obtains in the uninformed-voter setting
as well. This is because agents are more likely to free ride and follow a mixed strategy when
they are in the majority. In the uninformed regime, this is exactly what all agents think
after updating their beliefs about λt based on their own types.
Next, we consider the large election properties of the uninformed regime.
Electorate Size and the Majority Advantage
The analysis in this section essentially mimics that presented for the informed regime.
We ﬁrst note the following intuitive observation regarding the probability of voting.
15L￿￿￿￿ 6. φ∗(n) strictly decreases in n and converges to 0, as n → ∞.
That is, the equilibrium probability of voting decreases in the electorate size and becomes
negligible in large elections, because the free-rider problem is exacerbated in each political
group.
Now, recall that Xt and X0 denote the number of votes for alternative t, and the number
of abstentions, respectively. It is clear that (XA,XB,X0|n) ∼Multinomial(λAφ∗(n),λBφ∗(n),1−
φ∗(n)|n). The following result parallels Lemma 4.
L￿￿￿￿ 7. The limiting marginal distributions of XA and XB are independent Poisson
distributions with respective means λAM and λBM, where M = limn→∞[nφ∗(n)].
We now re-write the pivot probability in (11) in terms of XA and XB. To do so, we ﬁrst
observe that
T(φ∗(n),n|λA = λi) = Pr{XB = XA} + 2λi Pr{XB = XA + 1}. (14)



















f(k|λiM)f(k|(1 − λi)M) + 2λi
∞ ￿
k=0
f(k|λiM)f(k + 1|(1 − λi)M)
￿
≡ ΦU(M|θ,λ).
From (13), the expected aggregate turnout, MU, is determined by
ΦU(M|θ,λ) = 2c. (15)
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6. In the uninformed regime, for any voting cost c ∈ (0, 1
2) and any distrib-
ution of preferences (λ,θ), there exists a critical population size n such that n ≥ n implies
the existence of a unique symmetric BNE. Moreover,
(a) limn→∞ Pr{t wins|λt = λi} > 1
2 if and only if λi > 1
2.
(b) limc→0 limn→∞ Pr{t wins|λt = λi} = 1if and only if λi > 1
2.
16(c) mU
A = λAMU, and mU
B = λBMU, where the aggregate turnout, MU ∈ (0,∞), uniquely
solves (15).
Part (a) of Proposition 6 indicates that the non-neutrality result identiﬁed in Proposition
4 remains valid for large elections. The reason is that while the probability of voting
becomes negligible, the aggregate turnout is still signiﬁcant, and without electoral bias
under the uninformed regime, large elections favor the majority. In fact, as the cost of
voting converges to zero, the aggregate turnout grows so large that the majority wins with
virtual certainty, which is recorded in part (b). The last part of Proposition 6 simply says
that the expected turnout by each type of citizen is proportional to the fraction of that
type in the population. This contrasts with the informed case where the expected turnout
is equal across groups regardless of the initial distribution of preferences.
Before proceeding to the welfare analysis, it is worth comparing part (b) of Proposition
6 to Martinelli (2006). As mentioned in the Introduction, Martinelli studies a common-
values model of voting in which it is the information, rather than participation, that is
costly. He ﬁnds that while the amount of information each voter gathers becomes negligible
as the number of citizens increases, it does so slowly enough that the electorate remains
well-informed to choose the “right” alternative.
5 Welfare Comparison
Armed with the equilibrium outcomes of the two informational regimes, we are now ready to
investigate their implications for social welfare. The expected social welfare in this context
is the diﬀerence between the expected social beneﬁt and the expected social cost. Given
the payoﬀ structure in Table 1, and conditional on λA = λi, the expected social beneﬁt is
B(φ,n|λA = λi) = Pr{A wins|λi}λin + Pr{B wins|1 − λi}(1 − λi)n, whereas the expected
social cost is C(φ,n|λA = λi) = cλiφ∗
An+c(1−λi)φ∗
Bn. Hence, the expected social welfare is
W(φ,n|λA = λi) = B(n|λA = λi) −C(n|λA = λi). From an ex ante point of view however,
since the realization of λA is unknown, we compare the ex ante social beneﬁt, cost and













The following result lays out a central ﬁnding of this paper.
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7. (Welfare) Suppose (4) and (5) hold so that a type-symmetric totally-mixed










Part (a) reveals that the expected social cost of voting is strictly greater under the
informed regime, which is equivalent to saying that the expected turnout is higher. The
intuition behind this result is easily grasped. For any λt, the expected equilibrium voter
turnout is 2α∗n in the informed-voter setting and φ∗n in the uninformed-voter setting.
To see that 2α∗ > φ∗, consider a situation in which agents vote with the same ex ante
probability, 2α = φ, in each setting. In this case, a voter in the informed situation has a
higher probability of being pivotal than one in the uninformed situation, P(α,n) > Q(φ,n).
The reason is that when agents have better information, they are better positioned to vote
strategically. Speciﬁcally, with better information, agents who expect to be in the minority
vote with higher probability and agents who expect to be in the majority vote with lower
probability. This voter-composition eﬀect leads to a closer election and higher probability
of being pivotal in the informed-voter setting when the ex ante probability of voting is the
same across regimes. Of course, in equilibrium the probability of being pivotal must equal
2c in both settings. This, however, requires agents to vote with higher ex ante probability
in the informed-voter setting, 2α∗ > φ∗.
Part (b) of Proposition 7 says that the ex ante social beneﬁt is strictly higher in the
uninformed regime than in the informed one. The expected social beneﬁt is maximized
18when the alternative that is preferred by the majority group wins. As explained above,
this is more likely to be the case with the uninformed regime. In particular, in a large
election with a small cost of voting, the majority wins with probability close to 1 under the
uninformed regime whereas this probability still remains at 1
2 under the informed regime.
Together with part (a) and (b), it follows that expected welfare is unambiguously higher
when agents are uninformed about the composition of the electorate, as recorded in part
(c).
An implication of this ﬁnding is that the public release of information that resolves all
uncertainty about the distribution of voter preferences reduces welfare. The reason for this
ineﬃciency is twofold. First, when the distribution of voter preferences becomes common
knowledge, each agent knows exactly whether he belongs to the expected minority or the
expected majority group. In this instance, as explained following Proposition 1, each agent
tailors his voting strategy to his expected group size so that in equilibrium each group is
equally likely to win the election. When no information about the distribution of voter
preferences is provided, however, each agent votes with the same equilibrium probability,
making the expected majority more likely to win, which is obviously better for welfare.
Second, as Proposition 7 reveals, the expected total cost of voting is smaller when voters
are uninformed. The reason is that when uninformed, all agents put more weight on being
in the majority and hence possess less incentive to vote.
6 An Extension: Uncertainty and Welfare
To this point we have compared two informational regimes, and showed that the uninformed
regime outperforms the informed one in expected social welfare. Under the uninformed
regime, agents are ignorant about whether they belong to the majority or minority. Al-
though this uncertainty leads them to vote less vigorously and keep social cost lower than
under the informed regime, it also reduces electoral bias and increases the probability that
the majority wins. Staying within the uninformed regime, a natural question is then to ask
whether greater uncertainty results in higher social welfare. To investigate this issue, we
ﬁrst deﬁne the degree of uncertainty via a mean-preserving spread over θ.
D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. (Mean-Preserving Spread) Let θ￿ = (θ1￿,...,θ￿
r+1
2 ￿￿,...,θr￿) and θ = (θ1,...,
θ￿
r+1
2 ￿,...,θr) be two symmetric distributions over {λ1,...,λ￿
r+1
2 ￿,...,λr}. Distrib-






θi￿ ≥ θi, if i = 1,...,i0





The following result shows that increasing uncertainty about political preferences not
only improves the chances of the majority winning the election but also reduces the expected
cost of voting by reducing the incentive to turnout.
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 8. Let θ￿ and θ be two symmetric priors that induce respective equilibrium
voting probabilities φ￿∗ and φ∗. If θ￿ is a mean-preserving spread of θ, then for any
n (ﬁnite or inﬁnite),
(a) φ￿∗ ≤ φ∗
(b) B(θ￿,λ,n) ≥ B(θ,λ,n)
(c) W(θ￿,λ,n) ≥ W(θ,λ,n).
The intuition behind part (a) is obvious. When agents are more uncertain about political
preferences, they expect that the election is less likely to be close, which, in turn, makes
their votes less pivotal, curbing the incentive to turnout. This reduces the expected social
cost. Part (b) is, however, less obvious. To see this, recall that the expected social beneﬁt
increases if and only if the probability of winning for the majority increases. However, by
encouraging fewer citizens to vote, greater uncertainty adversely aﬀects this probability.
What part (b) shows is that the positive direct eﬀect of greater uncertainty outweighs the
negative strategic eﬀect. The last part then follows from part (a) and (b).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the impact of public information about the composition of
the electorate on equilibrium voting behavior. Our theoretical ﬁndings demonstrate that
providing more information of this kind to potential voters harms the democratic process.
It biases electoral outcomes toward the alternative preferred by the minority and it leads
to higher expected aggregate voting costs.
Although we have employed a standard costly voting model where voters possess intrinsic
preferences (i.e., private values) over electoral alternatives and a ﬁxed identical cost of
voting, the model can be extended in various ways to lend additional realism and provide
20guidance for policymakers. In what follows, we brieﬂy discuss three possible extensions of
the basic model.
• Cost Uncertainty. Our assumption that all agents possess the same cost of voting
is clearly a dramatic simpliﬁcation. We have, however, investigated a more realistic
setting where agents’ costs are drawn independently from a continuous distribution
G(·) deﬁned on [c0,c1] as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). Our analysis revealed that
all results except for the weak neutrality ﬁnding in Proposition 1 remain essentially
unchanged. In particular, the strong neutrality result under the informed regime, and
the main welfare conclusions continue to hold under cost (or beneﬁt) heterogeneity.
The breakdown of weak neutrality under the informed regime implies that the ma-
jority is more likely to win the election when the population is ﬁnite, although an
under-dog eﬀect still obtains that gives the minority a disproportionate probability
of winning. The intuition is as follows. As noted in Proposition 1, weak neutrality
requires that voting cost not be so small as to violate the mixed strategy equilibrium.
Otherwise, even if the minority agents vote with probability 1, they will be unable
to completely neutralize the majority, and thus for small costs, the majority is more
likely to win. When costs are drawn from a continuous distribution, the equilibrium
must account for all possible cost realizations (including the small ones), implying
that the majority wins with probability greater than 1
2. In a large election, however,
only the agents whose costs are close to the lower bound c0 vote. In this case, the
equilibrium conditions coincide with the setting studied above with voting cost equal
to c0. Hence, the probability that either side wins is 1/2 independent of λ in this case.
• Common values. It seems plain that in many elections voters are motivated pri-
marily by their fundamental ideologies. Party aﬃliations and political labels such as
Liberal and Conservative obviously connote intrinsic diﬀerences in ideological princi-
ples. Hence, in elections where ideologies are especially important, the ﬁndings pre-
sented in this paper regarding the release of public information sound a precautionary
note. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that some fraction of citizens may be
non partisans whose objective is to elect the “best” or “most qualiﬁed” candidate. It
would, therefore, be very interesting to investigate the role of public information in a
richer model that allows for both partisan and nonpartisan citizens.
• Endogenous Source of Information. To the extent that opinion polls, political
21stock markets, and expert forecasts contain real information about voter sentiment,
our analysis reveals that their publication may actually impede eﬃciency, giving rise to
closely contested elections with excessive voter turnout. Before ﬁrm policy conclusions
can be drawn, however, future research must investigate the endogeneity of the source
of information about political preferences. In particular, given the feedback we ﬁnd
between information and equilibrium voting behavior, it is important to understand
the incentives for individuals to report their true preferences to pollsters and the
incentives for pollsters and pundits to disclose publicly and fully any information they
obtain.22
Appendix
P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ L￿￿￿￿ 1: Suppose 0 < φt < 1 for t = A,B. First, note that a type t agent’s






























t￿ (1 − φt￿)n−1−k−kt￿ +
￿






















































t￿ (1 − φt￿)n−1−k−kt

.
To understand these expected payoﬀs, ﬁx a type t agent, and let kt be the number of
votes for alternative t excluding his, and kt￿ be the number of all votes for alternative t￿.
Clearly, if kt￿ ≤ kt − 1 and kt￿ ≥ kt + 2, then alternative t respectively wins and loses with
probability 1, regardless of the type t agent’s action. If kt￿ = kt, alternative t wins with
22Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) consider competition among forecasters whose payoﬀs depend on the ex
post accuracy of their forecasts. The diﬀerence in an election context is that accuracy depends on the voters’
endogenous behavior.
22probability 1 if the type t agent in question votes, and wins with probability 1
2 if he abstains
and leaves the tie. Finally, if kt￿ = kt + 1, alternative t loses with probability 1 if the type
t agent abstains; but may win with probability 1
2 if he votes. These events explain the
expressions in parentheses above. The ﬁrst two summations in U1
t and U0




t , the third summation inside parentheses cancel out, re-






































t￿ (1 − φt￿)n−2−k−kt
￿
− c.
Now, recall αt = λtφt and deﬁne βt = λt(1−φt). By substituting for these terms into (A-1),





(1 − λt)n−1−k = (1 − λt)kt(1 − λt)n−1−k−kt
(1 − λt)n−1−k = (1 − λt)kt+1(1 − λt)n−2−k−kt,



































































































kt,kt,n − 1 − 2kt
￿￿
















kt,kt + 1,n − 2 − 2kt
￿￿














































































t￿ (βt + βt￿)n−2−2k − c,








































and, w.l.o.g., change index of summations to k in the last equality.
The expressions in (1) and (2) then follows by simply observing that βA + βB = 1 −
αA − αB. ￿
P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1: Suppose (φA,φB) is a symmetric BNE in totally mixed
strategies, i.e., 0 < φt < 1 for t = A,B. Then, ∆t = 0, or equivalently
1
2
Pt(αt,αt￿) − c = 0. (A-2)






















t￿(1 − αt − αt￿)n−2−2k
.
24Hence, αA = αB, or equivalently λAφA = λBφB.
To prove part (ii), let αt = α. Note that the ex ante probability that a citizen votes is



















































If an even number k > 0 of citizens vote, then a tie occurs in the event that j = k
2 of
them vote for alternative B, in which case the election is decided by a coin toss. Hence, the






















Finally, if k = 0 citizens vote, then A also wins with probability 1
2. ￿
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k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!
−
2(n − 1 − 2k)
(k!)2(n − 1 − 2k)!
￿
α2k(1 − 2α)n−2−2k
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k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!
−
2
(k!)2(n − 2 − 2k)!
￿
α2k(1 − 2α)n−2−2k






2(n − 2 − 2k)
k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!
−
2(k + 1)
((k + 1)!)2(n − 1 − 2(k + 1))!
￿
α2k+1(1 − 2α)n−3−2k
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((k + 1)!)2(n − 1 − 2(k + 1))!
−
2(n − 2 − 2k)




k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!
−
2
(k!)2(n − 2 − 2k)!
= −
1











k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!
α2k(1 − 2α)n−2−2k < 0. ￿
26P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2: Since, from Lemma 2, P(α,n) is strictly decreasing in
α ∈ (0, 1
2), there is at most one solution to 1
2P(α,n) − c = 0. Moreover, a solution exists
if and only if 1
2P(0,n) − c > 0 and 1
2P(1
2,n) − c < 0. It is easy to verify that P(0,n) = 1
and 1
2P(1
2,n) ≡ c(n) as given in (6). Hence, there is a unique solution α∗(c,n) to equation
(3) if and only if c(n) < c < 1
2. For α∗(c,n) to be part of an equilibrium however, it also
needs to satisfy: 0 < φt =
α∗(c,n)
λt < 1 and 0 < φt￿ =
α∗(c,n)
1−λt < 1, or combining the two:
α∗(c,n) < λt < 1 − α∗(c,n). ￿
P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ L￿￿￿￿ 3: We ﬁrst show by induction that
c(n) =

   














2k+2, if n is even.
(A-3)
Note that c(2) = c(3) = 1
4, which is true by (6). Next, let the expression in (A-3) hold true
for some arbitrary n. By (6), observe that
c(n + 1) =
￿ n
n+1c(n), if n is odd
c(n), if n is even,
,
which coincides with the expression obtained from (A-3) for c(n + 1), completing the in-
duction argument.
Since 2k+1






k+2. Simple algebra shows b(n) = 1 √
n+2, which converges to 0.
Hence, lim
n→∞c(n) = 0.
To prove that α∗(c,n) is decreasing in n, it suﬃces to prove P(α,n) is decreasing in n.
By deﬁnition,
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α2k+1(1 − 2α)n−1−2k.
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α2k(1 − 2α)n−2k
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α2k−1(1 − 2α)n−2k












k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!
α2k+1(1 − 2α)n−2−2k.
Inserting this into (A-4) and canceling terms yield
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28Given that α∗(c,n) is decreasing in n and bounded below by 0, it converges to some α￿ ≥






We now argue that if α￿ > 0, then lim
n→∞P(α￿,n) = 0. To see this, let Xt be the number
of votes for alternative t (as in the text), and Y = XA − XB be the vote diﬀerence. Then,
P(α￿,n) = Pr{Y = 0} + Pr{Y = 1}.
For a large n, we have Y →D Normal(0,2nα￿). Hence, as n → ∞, it follows that
Pr{Y = 0} → 0 and Pr{Y = 1} → 0, implying that P(α￿,n) → 0. But this contra-
dicts lim
n→∞P(α￿,n) = 2c ￿= 0. Hence, α￿ = 0. The same exact arguments hold for an even
n.
The last part simply follows from (3), which holds for any n in a totally mixed strategy
equilibrium. ￿









(0,1) since 0 < α∗
t(n) < λt (and thus 0 < α∗
A(n) + α∗
B(n) < 1). Moreover, for a ﬁxed XB,
since limn→∞ α∗











Hence, (see Billingsley 1995, Theorem 23.2)
(XA|XB)
D −→ Poisson(mA),
which is independent of XB. The same argument shows
(XB|XA)
D −→ Poisson(mB).
Hence, the limiting distributions of XA and XB are independent, which further implies
(XA + XB)
D −→ Poisson(mA + mB). ￿
P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3: Fix any pair of (λt,c) ∈ (0,1) × (0, 1
2). By Proposition
2, there is a unique symmetric mixed-strategy BNE if and only if c ∈ (c(n), 1
2) and λt ∈
(α∗(c,n),1 − α∗(c,n)). Since as n grows, both c(n) and α∗(c,n) decrease and converge to
0 by Lemma 3, there exist two thresholds n￿(c), n￿￿(λt) < ∞ such that c ∈ (c(n), 1
2) for all
n > n￿(c) and λt ∈ (α∗(c,n),1−α∗(c,n)) for all n > n￿￿(λt). Deﬁne n = max{n￿(c), n￿￿(λt)}.
Then, there exists a unique symmetric BNE for all n ≥ n.
29Part (a) follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 3. To prove part (b), ﬁrst note that
eq.(9) implies mI
A = mI
B. This means, after substituting for mI
A = mI
B = M
2 , eq.(9) reduces
to ΦI(M
2 , M












k!(k+1)! by (8). Next, we
show that ΦI(M
2 , M









































































































It is easy to verify that ΦI(0,0) = 1 and limM→∞ ΦI(M
2 , M
2 ) = 0, which imply








) − 2c] < 0.
Hence, there is a unique MI ∈ (0,∞) that satisﬁes ΦI(M
2 , M
2 ) = 2c. ￿
P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4: To prove part (a), suppose (φA,φB) is a symmetric BNE
in totally mixed strategies. Then, eq.(10) implies
E[PA(λAφA,(1 − λA)φB)|A] = E[PB((1 − λA)φB,λAφA)|B]. (A-5)
Next, we establish
E[PB(1 − λA)φB,λAφA)|B] = E[PA(λAφB,(1 − λA)φA)|A]. (A-6)
30To see this, note from (2) that


























2θi(1 − λi)(λiφA)k+1((1 − λi)φB)k(1 − λiφA − (1 − λi)φB)n−2−2k
￿
.
Now, by symmetry of the prior
r ￿
i=1















2θiλr+1−i(λr+1−iφB)k((1 − λr+1−i)φA)k+1(1 − λr+1−iφB − (1 − λr+1−i)φA)n−2−2k
￿
.
Substituting these equalities into the above expression for E[PB((1−λA)φB,λAφA)|B] yields
(A-6). Next, combine (A-5) and (A-6) to get
E[PA(λAφA,(1 − λA)φB)|A] = E[PA(λAφB,(1 − λA)φA)|A].
To derive a contradiction to this, suppose w.l.o.g. that φA > φB. We show that this implies
E[PA(λAφA,(1 − λA)φB)|A] − E[PA(λAφB,(1 − λA)φA)|A] < 0.
31From (2) we have





























(1 − λi)φB(1 − λiφA − (1 − λi)φB)n−2−2k − (1 − λi)φA(1 − λiφB − (1 − λi)φA)n−2−2k
￿￿
.
Both of the double summations in this expression are negative. To see that the ﬁrst one is






(1 − λiφA − (1 − λi)φB)n−1−2k − (1 − λiφB − (1 − λi)φA)n−1−2k
￿
.





2θi(2λi − 1)(λi(1 − λi)φAφB)k
×
￿
(1 − λiφA − (1 − λi)φB)n−1−2k − (1 − λiφB − (1 − λi)φA)n−1−2k
￿
.
(If r is odd, the expression is still valid in this case since the term involving λ￿
r+1
2 ￿ = 1
2
is automatically zero.) If k = n−1
2 , then each term in this summation is evidently zero. If
k < n−1
2 , then each term is negative. To see this, note that 2λi − 1 < 0 because we are
summing over the left half of the distribution. Moreover,
φA > φB ⇒ (1 − 2λi)φA > (1 − 2λi)φB
⇒ 1 − λiφA − (1 − λi)φB > 1 − λiφB − (1 − λi)φA
⇒ (1 − λiφA − (1 − λi)φB)n−1−2k > (1 − λiφB − (1 − λi)φA)n−1−2k.
A similar argument shows that the second double summation in the above expression is also
negative.
32The proof of part (b) closely follows the proof of its counterpart in Proposition 1. Since,
by part (a), each citizen votes with the same probability, φ, the probability that k citizens




(1 − φ)n−kφk. Moreover, since a citizen votes for alternative































































A (1 − λA)j,
which is greater than 1
2 if and only if λA > 1
2.
If an even number k > 0 of citizens vote, then a tie occurs in the event that j = k
2 of
them vote for alternative B, in which case the election is decided by a coin toss. Hence, the

































































































, the probability that A wins is strictly greater than 1
2 if and only if
λA > 1
2.
Finally, if k = 0 citizens vote, then A wins with probability 1
2. ￿







where T(φ,n|λA = λi) is deﬁned in (12). First, we show that Q(φ,n) is decreasing in φ










(k − 1)!k!(n − 1 − 2k)!







(k!)2(n − 2 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))kφ2k(1 − φ)n−2−2k





(2k + 1)(n − 1)!
k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))kφ2k(1 − φ)n−2−2k






k!(k + 1)!(n − 3 − 2k)!








(k − 1)!k!(n − 1 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))kφ2k−1(1 − φ)n−1−2k






(k)!(k + 1)!(n − 3 − 2k)!










(k!)2(n − 2 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))kφ2k(1 − φ)n−2−2k





(2k + 1)(n − 1)!
k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!







(k!)2(n − 2 − 2k)!








(2k + 1)(n − 1)!
k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!









k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))kφ2k(1 − φ)n−2−2k < 0.
where we use the fact that 2λi(1 − λi) ≤ 1
2.
Given that Q(φ,n) is decreasing in φ ∈ (0,1), (13) has a unique solution φ∗(n) ∈ (0,1)
if and only if 1
2Q(0,n) − c > 0 and 1
2Q(1,n) − c ≤ 0. Noting Q(0,n) = 1 and deﬁning
c(n) = 1
2Q(1,n), the result follows. ￿

























The same argument proves the case for n even. ￿
P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ L￿￿￿￿ 6: Since Q(φ,n) is decreasing in φ, it suﬃces to show Q(φ,n) is
decreasing in n for a ﬁxed φ ∈ (0,1). To do so, we prove that each term T(φ,n|λA = λi) is
decreasing in n. But this just mimics the proof of the similar result for α∗(n) in part (ii) of
35Lemma 3. In particular,






(k!)2(n − 1 − 2k)!







k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!















k!(k + 1)!(n − 1 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))k+1φ2k+1(1 − φ)n−1−2k.


















(k!)2(n − 1 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))kφ2k(1 − φ)n−2k





(k!)2(n − 1 − 2k)!






k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))k+1φ2k+1(1 − φ)n−2−2k.
Inserting this fact and simplifying terms yield





(k!)2(n − 1 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))kφ2k+1(1 − φ)n−1−2k





k!(k + 1)!(n − 2 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))kφ2k+1(1 − φ)n−1−2k





k!(k + 1)!(n − 1 − 2k)!
(λi(1 − λi))kφ2k+1(1 − φ)n−1−2k > 0.
The same exact argument follows for n even. Finally, similar arguments for lim
n→∞α∗(n) =
0 show lim
n→∞φ∗(n) = 0. ￿
36P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ L￿￿￿￿ 7: This uses the exact lines in the proof of Lemma 4, except that
we replace αA(n) with λAφ∗(n), and αB(n) with λBφ∗(n). ￿
P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6: The existence of a unique symmetric BNE follows from
Proposition 5, Lemma 5, and the observation that limn→∞ c(n) = 0 by part (i) of Lemma
3. Now, we prove the remainder of the proposition.





⇔ Pr{XA > XB} +
1
2
















Now, suppose λi > 1




⇔ λi > (1 − λi) ⇔ (λi)k−j > (1 − λi)k−j
⇔ (λiMU)k((1 − λi)MU)j > (λiMU)j((1 − λi)MU)k












The same argument shows that Pr{A wins|λi} < 1
2 if and only if λi < 1
2, and
Pr{A wins|λi} = 1
2 if and only if λi = 1
2.
(b),(c) Here, we ﬁrst prove part (c). The fact that mU
A = λAMU, and mU
B = λBMU
follows from Lemma 7. Moreover, one can easily show as in the proof of part (b)
of Proposition 3 that ΦU(M|λ,θ) is strictly decreasing in M; ΦU(0|λ,θ) = 1; and
(3) limM→∞ ΦU(M|λ,θ) = 0. Hence, there exists a unique MU ∈ (0,∞) that solves
ΦU(M|λ,θ) = 2c. From here, it also follows that MU is strictly decreasing in c, and
becomes arbitrarily large as c → 0. Together with part (a), this proves part (b). ￿
P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7: Suppose (4) and (5) hold so that a symmetric totally-mixed
strategy BNE obtains in either informational setting. Each part is proven in turn.
37(a) Suppose n < ∞. Since for λA = λi, CI(n|λA = λi) = 2ncα∗(n) by Proposition 1, and
CU(n|λA = λi) = ncφ∗(n) by Proposition 4, it suﬃces to show that α∗(n) >
φ∗(n)
2 .
Deﬁne ￿ φ =
φ
2 and ￿ PA(￿ φ|n,λA = λi) ≡ PA(λi2￿ φ,(1 − λi)2￿ φ,n). Then,







k,k,n − 1 − 2k
￿
22k(λi(1 − λi))k￿ φ
2k








k,k + 1,n − 2 − 2k
￿
22k+1(λi)k(1 − λi)k+1￿ φ
2k+1
(1 − 2￿ φ)n−2−2k.
Since 2λi(2(1 − λi)) < 1, we have











(1 − 2￿ φ)n−1−2k



















θiλi2(1 − λi) < 1
2, it follows that
r ￿
i=1







Finally, Lemma 2 and the proof of Proposition 5 established that both P(ˆ φ,n) and
Q(2￿ φ,n) are decreasing in ￿ φ, implying that α∗ >
φ∗
2 where 1




2 ),n) − c = 0.
For n → ∞, we have 2nα∗(n) → MI and nφ∗(n) → MU by deﬁnition; and hence
CI(φ∗(n),n|λA = λi) → cMI and CU(φ∗(n),n|λA = λi) → cMU, where, the limit turnouts
under the informed and informed regimes, MI and MU satisfy ΦI(M
2 , M
2 ) = 2c and ΦU(M|λ,θ) =
2c, respectively. Since, from the proofs of Propositions 3 and 6, both ΦI(M
2 , M
2 ) and









2 by deﬁnition, a similar comparison to the case with n < ∞ implies
MI > MU.
(b) Suppose n < ∞. From Proposition 1 and 4, it is obvious that BI(φ,n|λA = λi) <
BU(φ,n|λA = λi), and hence B
I(θ,λ,n) < B
U(θ,λ,n). This result also holds for





Pr{A wins|λA=λi}λi+Pr{B wins|λA=λi}(1−λi) < 1 by
Proposition 4.
(c) It directly follows from part (a) and (b). ￿
P￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 8. Let θ be a symmetric distribution over a ﬁxed support
λ, and φ∗(θ) be the equilibrium voting probability, which satisﬁes (13). Decomposing the




















θiT(φ∗(n),n|λA = λi) = c.
(A-7)








T(φ∗(n),n|λA = λi0) − T(φ∗(n),n|λA = λj)









j(θ), ﬁrst recall from the proof of Proposition 5 that ∂
∂φT(.) < 0. Moreover,
it is easy to verify from (12) that T(φ∗(n),n|λA = λi) is increasing in λi for λi < 1
2,
stationary at λi = 1
2, and decreasing in λi for λi > 1
2. Thus, for any j < i0, we have
T(φ∗(n),n|λA = λi0) − T(φ∗(n),n|λA = λj) > 0, which implies ∂
∂θjφ∗(θ) < 0. A similar






These two observations reveal that if θ￿ and θ are two symmetric distributions such that
θ￿ is a mean-preserving spread over θ as deﬁned in section 6, then φ∗(θ￿) ≤ φ∗(θ), proving
part (a).
To prove part (b), we recall the deﬁnition B(θ,λ,n) in section 5, and w.l.o.g., use a




















B(φ,n|λA = λi) = Pr{A wins|λA = λi}λin + Pr{B wins|λA = λi}(1 − λi)n. (A-10)
39Moreover, we have







k,k￿,n − k − k￿
￿
(λiφ∗(θ))k￿
((1 − λi)φ∗(θ))k(1 − φ∗(θ))n−k−k￿
Pr{B wins|λA = λi} = Pr{A wins|λA = 1 − λi}.
Inserting (A-11) into (A-10), and then into (A-9) yields
B(θ,φ∗(θ)) = B(θ,λ,φ∗(θ),n).










It is easy to show that ∂
φB(θ,φ∗(θ)) > 0 because ∂





≥ 0 if 1 ≤ j < i0




From the proof of part (a), this means for 1 ≤ j < i0, while the ﬁrst term in (A-12) is
positive, the second term is negative. However, a tedious algebra shows that it is overall





Together these two observations prove part (b).
The last part directly follows from part (a) and (b). ￿
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